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THE ETHICAL LEGITIMACY OF CLASSACTION, INSTITUTIONAL-REFORM
LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF
CHILDREN: A RESPONSE TO
MARTHA MATTHEWS
Christopher Dunn*

(
INTRODUCTION

N an effort to defend "structural reform" litigation from the charge
that it is little more than a vehicle for activist lawyers to use children to override legitimate legislative choices, Martha Matthews suggests a number of ways through which plaintiffs' counsel in these cases
can do a better job of ascertaining and representing the interests of
children class members.' Unfortunately, her suggestions, though
likely to improve representation, do little to advance the effort to give
client children a greater say in this type of litigation. The good news,
however, is that this does not undermine the ethical legitimacy of this
work.
I. Tim

PROBLEMS IN ASCERTAINING AND REPRESENTING THE
PREFERENCES OF CHILDREN IN STRUCTURAL REFORM

CLASS-ACTION LITIGATION

As Matthews notes, lawyers encounter special problems when representing children in class-action cases seeking to reform government
systems such as mental-health systems, foster-care systems, and juvenile-detention systems-cases she refers to as "structural reform"
cases.2 These problems fall into two categories: those endemic to representation of children and those endemic to representation of classes.
As an initial matter, attorneys in children's litigation face the challenge of representing clients who, by virtue of their maturity, may be
incapable of forming or expressing informed and rational judgments
about the issues that are the subject of the representation. Though
most classes will include children who will be able to form and express
judgments, they also will include large numbers of children who, as
1985, University of Pennsylvania. Between 1987 and 1995 the author
served as staff counsel for the Children's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and in that capacity litigated class-action, foster-care reform cases around
the country. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not
reflect ACLU policies or positions.
1. See Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The EthicalDuty of Representation in Client's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435 (1996).
2. See id. at 1436 n.2 (citing Owen M. Fiss as the scholar who first coined the term
"structural reform").
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Matthews puts it, "cannot state their own needs and desires." 3 For
example, class actions on behalf of abused and neglected children will
include many infants and toddlers who are incapable of developing
useful judgments.
Beyond the issue of client capacity in structural-reform litigation
are problems peculiar to class actions seeking injunctive relief on behalf of clients in a variety of situations, as is typical of structuralreform litigation. As Matthews observes, such cases involve hundreds
or even thousands of clients whose different situations suggest different interests. 4 Thus, using again the foster-care reform case that Matthews discusses, some children class members may need improved
investigations into reports of suspected abuse, other children may
need better foster homes, other children may need improved adoption
services, and yet other children may have families who need material
assistance so the child can return home from foster care. Each of
these situations suggests a different set of client interests.
Recognizing these two problems, Matthews proposes a variety of
approaches that lawyers representing children in structural-reform litigation can employ to increase client control and to mediate potential
conflicts. In response to the client-control problem, Matthews suggests (1) that counsel educate themselves about "child and adolescent
development" so as to make attorney communication with child clients as meaningful as possible;5 (2) that counsel use a combination of
techniques-such as client interviews, polls, group meetings, and even
public hearings-to solicit client opinions;6 (3) that counsel pay particular attention to the views of named plaintiffs as well as to the views
of adults-parents, guardians,7 even defendants-who are interested
in the litigation;8 and (4) that counsel employ "the values of 'client3. Id. at 1442; see also id. at 1459 (stating that Model Rule 1.4 "should be interpreted as creating a duty to use all feasible means to communicate with and solicit the
Views of child clients").
4. Id. at 1446-48. This encompasses the problem of future unknown class members that Matthews.discusses, as these children simply have different interests by virtue of the fact that they have not yet joined the class.
The potential attorney-based conflicts raised by Matthews seem to present a set of
issues unrelated to the structural-reform context (though they arise in it). The ques/ tion of pressure on attorneys to settle cases and get fees as opposed to engaging in
protracted litigation, see id at 1447-48, flows from the payment arrangement between
the client and the lawyer, attorneys engaged in personal-injury representation on a
contingency basis are under the same pressure as are public-interest attorneys litigating structural-reform cases. As for the question of pressures created by the policies of
organizations employing attorneys conducting structural reform litigation, see id. at
1448, this flows from the employer/employee context in which many lawyers operate
(be they employed by law firms, the government, or corporations) rather than on any
peculiar aspect of structural-reform litigation.
5. I& at 1458.
6. Id. at 1460, 1462.
7. I& at 1460.
8. Id. at 1467.
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centered lawyering.' "9 As for mediating the diverse interests
amongst class members, Matthews proposes (1) that counsel study
"available social-science and developmental literature on the impact
of alternative approaches to the children's situations;"'10 (2) that counsel make unusual efforts "to disclose any emerging conflicts to the
court at all stages of the litigation" 1 and "never stifle or conceal any
hints of emerging dissent"' 2 within the class; and (3) that counsel conlitigation to obtain appropriate relief for
sider strategies
3 other than
their clients.'
Most attorneys and commentators probably would agree that these
steps might well enhance the quality of representation in structuralreform litigation. The suggestion, however, that this is a program for
solving the client-control and divergent-interest problems identified
by Matthews seems misguided to me.
Looking first at the proposed client-control strategies, the suggestions that lawyers should become more sophisticated in interacting
with child clients and should employ a mix of techniques for collecting
information about client preferences are useful only if client preferences exist to be communicated and collected; as Matthews points out,
however, structural-reform litigation on behalf of children presents
the unique feature that many of the clients have no formed or expressible preferences, and thus even a perfect system for gauging client
preferences is useless for these clients and thus cannot solve the clientcapacity problem. Similarly, while Matthews's suggestion that counsel
pay particular attention to the views of the named plaintiffs and of
adults interested in the litigation may give the attorney more information about other people's opinions of class member preferences, it
does not help with the client-control problem; rather, it simply shifts
the problem to another group of persons who appear no more able
than class counsel to make the determinations that Matthews seeks. 4
The class-conflict mediation approaches raise similar problems.
The suggestions that counsel become more sophisticated about understanding the impact of certain remedies on children and that they
make unusual efforts to disclose emerging conflicts presumably would
9. Id. at 1461.
10. Id. at 1462.
11. Id- at 1463.
12. Id. at 1464.
13. Id. at 1470. Matthews also discusses potential limits on class certification, but
she ultimately takes no position on this and thus does not appear to be urging this as a
strategy for resolving possibly diverging interests within classes certified in structuralreform litigation. See id. at 1465-66.
14. This problem is compounded with the named plaintiffs in that they may lack
the requisite decision-making capacity. And even if named plaintiffs could form and
express rational judgments bearing on the representation, the views of a handful of
children selected by plaintiffs' counsel from amongst a class of hundreds or thousands
should not necessarily be accorded any special weight, as Matthews herself acknowledges. See id. at 1447.
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enhance the knowledge of attorneys and courts about the existence
and nuances of divergent interests amongst class members. Matthews,
however, does not explain how these approaches will assist the attorney in actually reconciling those divergent interests. In a similar vein,
the suggestion that counsel consider alternatives to litigation-even if
relevant' 5-simply suggests another fault line that may run through a
class without explaining how class counsel might bridge that gap.
II. THE ETHICAL LEGITIMACY OF CLASS-ACTION, STRUCTURALREFORM LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF CHILDREN SHOULD

NOT BE ASSESSED USING TRADITIONAL
ETHICAL STANDARDS

Though Matthews's proposals do not remedy the problems of limited client control and divergent class interests in structural-reform litigation on behalf of children, I do not share her concern that these
problems undermine the ethical legitimacy of such litigation. Unlike
Matthews, I do not accept that attorneys doing this work "must apply
ethical norms premised on a single client with articulated interests" to
their representation of children in these cases.' 6 Rather, I start from
the proposition that such norms cannot be applied to this work, which
then leads me to the question of alternative, appropriate ethical standards that might apply to structural-reform litigation.
A.

TraditionalNorms Concerning Client Control and Uniform
Client Interests CannotBe Applied to Structural-reform
Litigation on Behalf of Children
Despite Matthews's commendable attempt to bring structuralreform litigation representation within the bounds of traditional
norms of client control and uniform client interests, her effort is unavailing. This shortcoming reflects less on the merits of her proposals
and more on the difficulty of the task.
First, class control is not possible in these cases. As Matthews
notes, many of the clients will, by virtue of age, be too immature to
form or express rational judgments about any subject, and no amount
of sophisticated data collection or consultation with other adults can
change this. Moreover, structural-reform litigation presents significant client-capacity problems beyond those that Matthews suggests,
for even developmentally mature child class members will have little
to contribute to the types of decisions that must be made in this type
of litigation: What limits should be placed on worker caseloads?
15. To the extent that Matthews's article is intended to explore ethical obligations
flowing from an attorney-client relationship, the question of mediating class conflicts
through advocacy other than litigation does not seem to relate directly to the topic on
hand as no class attorney-client telationship exists in the absence of class certification,
which can occur only in the context of litigation.
16. I. at 1437.
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What training should workers receive? How many days should be
permitted for the development of case plans? Which consultants
should be retained to develop an information system? Though counsel in these cases must be well-informed about the interests and needs
of children class members, this is litigation in which the notion of client control is meaningless.
Uniform client interests in structural-reform litigation are also unattainable. These cases proceed with the recognition that "structural"
problems deprive children enmeshed in government systems of legally
mandated benefits and thus that the legal violations for any child or
group of children can be remedied only through "structural" reform.
Because such reform is best obtained after a showing of a broad pattern and practice of legal violations and because target government
systems encompass children in a wide variety of situations, these suits
necessarily include children who may have a wide range of interests.
Thus, returning to the foster-care context as an example, individual
children in state, foster-care custody have legal rights to a variety of
services, including written case plans, appropriate medical services,
safe and appropriate placements, and services designed to return children home or to allow them to be adopted if returning home is not
possible. The single state agencies that have custody of these children
often fail to provide these legally mandated services because of structural problems such as the failure to employ sufficient numbers of
qualified and trained social workers, the failure to recruit sufficient
numbers of foster and adoptive parents, and the failure to develop
necessary service resources. The only way to remedy the legal violations caused by these structural problems is to bring a class action on
behalf of all children in a jurisdiction's foster-care custody, as such a
suit allows advocates to adduce evidence of a broad pattern and practice of legal violations that in turn will support broad relief targeted at
the structural problems. Such a suit, however, necessarily encom17
passes children who, while "similarly situated" for Rule 23 purposes
by virtue of being in the foster-care custody of a single state agency,
nonetheless find themselves in different circumstances-some needing case plans, some needing foster homes, some needing adoptive
homes, some needing to go home, and some needing medical services.
Structural-reform litigation thus necessarily encompasses children
with linked but varying interests.
B. An Alternative Approach to Ethical Considerationsfor Guiding
the Representationof Children in Structural-reform
Litigation
If one accepts that traditional notions of client control and uniform
client interests cannot be applied to structural-reform litigation, one
17. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
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then must consider alternative ethical norms. Though this is not the
forum and I am not the person to propose a new set of standards for
attorneys representing children in structural-reform litigation, I do
have some suggestions about ways in which attorneys and courts can
respond better to the client-control and divergent-interest qualities inherent in this work so as to assure that child plaintiffs in structuralreform litigation receive effective, appropriate, and ethical class
representation.
* Counsel Should Have Substantive Expertise in the Area.
Given client incapacity, plaintiffs' counsel must have the substantive knowledge necessary to make decisions on behalf of
the class. Whether by training, experience, or even access to
experts, every lawyer undertaking structural-reform litigation on behalf of children should have a specialized understanding of the substantive issues that are the subject of the
litigation, be those issues related to child welfare, mental
health, juvenile detention, or other areas.
* Counsel Must Make an Unusual Effort to Identify the Interests of Plaintiff Class Members. Because counsel in these
cases will need to make decisions on behalf of class members
and because the class members will know little about the
facts that are relevant to the litigation, attorneys in these
cases should be obliged to make unusual efforts to inform
themselves of the factual circumstances of the class members. Through consultation with interested adults (be they
parents, advocates, guardians, or others), review of documents, inspection of facilities, and interviews with (or depositions of) relevant state officials, attorneys in structuralreform litigation should be expected to engage in extensive
fact gathering so as to maximize their ability to make informed decisions on behalf of their clients.
* Counsel Must Have the Ability to Undertake Structuralreform Litigation. In light of the lack of client control of
structural-reform litigation, the potentially broad impact of
this work, and the fact that children cannot opt out of these
classes, lawyers prosecuting these cases should have a special
duty to assure that they are capable of undertaking this litigation. First, they need to have the litigation experience to
handle complex cases that often involve massive amounts of
discovery and extensive substantive litigation that usually is
based on novel and difficult legal theories. Second, they
need to have the financial resources to litigate to conclusion
cases that can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Finally,
they must have the ability and commitment to stick with
these cases for many, many years, as implementation of re-
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form obligations-whether court ordered or negotiatedhas proven to be an extremely slow process that requires
considerable energy and diligence from plaintiffs' counsel.
Counsel should also be under a special obligation to inform
the court immediately if circumstances change such that
counsel no longer is able to continue aggressive prosecution
of the case.
* Courts Should Scrutinize the Qualifications of Counsel
Before Certifying a Class. Though the special expectations of
counsel listed above might be reflected in formal ethical
standards, courts also have a role to play in protecting the
interests of children class members in structural-reform litigation. Of paramount importance, courts should use the
class certification stage to assure themselves that counsel
seeking to represent a class have the expertise, resources,
and commitment to undertake this representation. Judicial
concern about class certification in these cases should focus
less on the scope of the proposed classes and much more on
the requirement of Rule 23 that the attorneys "will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."' 8
* Courts Should Make Unusual Efforts to Assess the Propriety of Relief. Given the potentially diverse interests within
the classes certified in structural-reform litigation and the
limited client input, courts should go to great lengths to assess the appropriateness of proposed relief. Whether the relief is negotiated and thus triggers a fairness hearing
conducted pursuant to Rule 23(e) 19 or is court-ordered, the
court should make unusual efforts to solicit the input of persons or entities able to offer meaningful comments about the
proposed relief. The court should also consider the appointment of experts pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence2 ° to assist it in formulating court-ordered relief or
in assessing relief proposed by the parties. The court may
also need to inquire about the details of the fact-finding done
by plaintiffs' counsel prior to any settlement so as to assure
itself that counsel is sufficiently informed about the interests
of the class members.
* Courts Should Take Unusual Steps to Assure that Counsel
are Litigating Cases Diligently. Given the lack of client control, courts need to make special efforts to assure that attorneys representing children in structural-reform litigation are
18.
19.
action
20.

Id.
See id.23(e) (requiring notice of a proposed dismissal or compromise of a class
to all members of the class prior to the dismissal or compromise).
See Fed. R. Evid. 706.
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pursuing their clients' interests aggressively. Whether this is
done through regular status conferences, written submissions
to the court, or other procedures, courts have a special
obligation in these cases to assure ongoing and aggressive
representation. This is particularly important in the postjudgment phase, in which the energy that goes into these
cases often lags.
CONCLUSION

Matthews correctly identifies two major challenges that confront
lawyers involved in structural-reform litigation on behalf of children:
lack of client control and diverse intraclass interests. Though her proposals do not solve these problems, the problems themselves do not
have the ethical implications that concern Matthews; rather, they are
inherent in this litigation. Consequently, the more fruitful response to
this situation is to consider a new set of standards to guide the lawyers
and courts involved in these cases.

